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SELLING YOUR SOUL AT THE CROSSROADS:
THE NEED FOR A HARMONIZED STANDARD
LIMITING THE PUBLICITY RIGHTS OF
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
“I went to the cross road; fell down on my knees.”1
“Every professional athlete owes a debt of gratitude to the fans
. . . .  He should never miss a payment.”2
INTRODUCTION
“Celebrity” does not come cheap.  Fame, notoriety, and the mone-
tary benefits stemming therefrom require time, talent, dedication, and
a will to succeed that can survive any setback or obstacle thrown in its
way.  There are shortcuts to fame and success, but taker beware:
though you may gain what you seek, payment will come due and you
may find you have written an “IOU” that you are not prepared to
fulfill.  If legend is to be believed, no one knows this to be truer than
influential blues guitarist Robert Johnson, the man who sold his soul
to the devil in exchange for the title of King of the Delta Blues.3
As the story goes, a young Johnson, desperate to realize his dreams
of musical greatness, paid a midnight visit to a deserted rural cross-
roads in order to barter his soul to Satan for the ability to play the
blues guitar.4  Allegedly, upon Johnson’s arrival at the fated cross-
roads, a large dark figure appeared and tuned Johnson’s guitar, an act
that transformed him from a struggling, mediocre musician to a Delta
Blues legend.5  Johnson flourished during the few short years he was
alive after his midnight deal with the devil, but the devil eventually
1. Robert Johnson, Cross Road Blues (Vocalion Records 1934).
2. Quotation of Bobby Hull, in GREAT QUOTES FROM GREAT SPORTS HEROES 80 (Peggy
Anderson ed., 1997).
3. BARRY LEE PEARSON & BILL MCCULLOCH, ROBERT JOHNSON: LOST AND FOUND 89
(2003).  There is some debate over whether this legend actually originated with Robert Johnson.
A number of accounts actually credit blues musician Tommy Johnson with being the first to
pawn away his eternal soul to a sinister figure at the crossroads in exchange for a mastery of the
blues. See DAVID EVANS, TOMMY JOHNSON 22–24 (1971).  However, because the tale is most
commonly associated with Robert Johnson, this author assumes for the purposes of this Com-
ment that the credit correctly lies with him.
4. R. GARY PATTERSON, TAKE A WALK ON THE DARK SIDE: ROCK AND ROLL MYTHS, LEG-
ENDS, AND CURSES 3 (2004).
5. See id. at 8.
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came looking for what Johnson owed.6  The victim of an alleged
poisoning, Johnson died under suspicious circumstances in 1938.7
Midnight bargains with Satan for talent, fame, and fortune seem to
have faded from popularity in recent years, perhaps in response to the
unpleasant manner in which the devil has been known to collect from
his debtors.8  However, people continue to make deals with metaphor-
ical devils every day.  Professional athletes in particular must negoti-
ate for their notoriety and celebrity statuses, but recently Satan has
taken a backseat to a more figuratively devilish party: the fans.  And
that “devil” is just as eager to collect as the one who met with Robert
Johnson at the crossroads on that fateful night.
At least one scholar has noted how important the adoring public is
in the creation of celebrity.9  The public participates directly and ac-
tively in the process of creating and shaping a celebrity image,10 and in
no realm of celebrity is this clearer than in that of the professional
athlete.11  The public—the metaphorical devil to the deal—is owed
something from professional athletes in exchange for this generous
grant.  Specifically, the public is owed the right to exploit the images
and likenesses of the athletes that it has actively helped to cultivate
for expressive purposes.12
Athletes have been able to avoid satisfying their end of the bargain,
however, through the development and exploitation of the so-called
right of publicity.  Established in the 1950s, the right of publicity is
“the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial
use of his or her identity.”13 Athletes are increasingly invoking the
right of publicity in an attempt to control both commercial and ex-
6. See id. at 9.
7. Id. at 10.
8. Robert Johnson allegedly suffered a slow, tortured death after enduring “three days of
intense, excruciating pain.”  Id.  Johannes Faust, whose fabled pact with Satan is credited with
originating the “deal with the devil” legend, was left charred and mutilated upon the expiration
of his deal. MIRIAM VAN SCOTT, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HELL 118–20 (1998).
9. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights,
81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 190–96 (1993).
10. Id. at 193–94.
11. See Geoff Crawly, The Most Important Position in Professional Sports: Fan, BLEACHER
REPORT (Nov. 3, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/283740-the-most-important-position-
in-professional-sports-fan.
12. See Madow, supra note 9, at 195–96 (arguing that because a celebrity cannot say that her
public image is solely the product of her own effort, she cannot claim exclusive ownership or
control of the economic values that attach to it).
13. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2004).  It
is worth noting that, though the focus of this Comment is on celebrities and athletes, the right of
publicity is not strictly a “right of celebrity.” Id.
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pressive appropriations of their likenesses.14  This trend is most evi-
dent in publicity rights litigation concerning the depiction of athletes’
likenesses in video games.15  Such depictions are currently at issue in
Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc., a case in which a class of retired NFL
players is suing Electronic Arts (EA), the makers of the Madden
video games,16 for using their likenesses within the game without their
consent.17  While athletes’ success in these actions has been mixed,18
the progression of Davis thus far reflects courts’ willingness to favor
athletes in right of publicity cases.19 Davis also exemplifies the lack of
uniformity in right of publicity jurisprudence, and the outcomes that
can result.20
Davis and other similar cases illustrate the multifaceted problems
with the right of publicity, and the difficulty courts have rectifying
those issues. Affirmation of the district court’s decision in Davis—as
well as the outcome of Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.21—has not only
failed to harmonize the multiplicity of conflicting tests for right of
14. See C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir.
2007); see also Cardtoons, L.C. v. MLB Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996); Doe v. TCI
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
15. See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010),
aff’d sub nom., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d
1268 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09-CV-1598, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
131387 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2009), aff’d, 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013).
16. The Madden NFL series is a long-running video game series that seeks to create a digital
version of the National Football League by substantially replicating each player’s real-life abili-
ties.  The games contain both active players and “historic” retired players.  Active players are
depicted with the correct names and jersey numbers, while historic players are given no names
and different jersey numbers from their real-life counterparts.
17. Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint, Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. CV 10-3328, at 4–6 (N.D.
Cal. July 29, 2010), available at http://xbox360movies.ign.com/xbox360/document/article/110/
1109826/maddensuit.pdf.
18. Compare Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *3 (holding plaintiff’s use of the athlete’s likeness in
a video game violated the athlete’s right of publicity), with Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
131387 (holding plaintiff’s use of the athlete’s likeness in a video game was protected by the First
Amendment).
19. The district court denied Electronic Arts’ motion to dismiss the case pursuant to First
Amendment protection.  Ben Strauss, NFL Retiree Lawsuit Against EA to Proceed to Court,
GAMES INDUSTRY (March 30, 2012 5:57 PM), http://www.gamesindustry.biz/articles/2012-03-30-
nfl-retiree-lawsuit-to-proceed-to-court-against-ea.
20. The court’s denial of EA’s motion was at the time seemingly at odds with the New Jersey
district court’s decision to dismiss a similar case in 2011 on the same First Amendment grounds
claimed by EA in Davis. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D.N.J. 2011).  The
district court decisions in Hart and Keller were recently overturned by the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013), and the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litiga-
tion, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013), respectively.  The implications of these decisions are dis-
cussed infra Part II.B.3.
21. See Keller, 2010 WL 530108; see also infra notes 87–97 and the accompanying text.
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publicity cases,22 but also indicates the continued expansion of already
over-inflated and under-standardized publicity rights for professional
athletes.  The trend will likely significantly disrupt the balance be-
tween professional athletes and the public that grants that publicity.
No matter what the ongoing impact of these cases proves to be, they
make one thing clear: courts cannot craft a meaningful solution to the
right of publicity problem.  Judges make poor advocates for the devil.
This Comment addresses the multitude of problems relating to the
publicity rights of athletes.  It responds to these problems by propos-
ing a harmonized right of publicity standard that curtails current pub-
licity rights while securing adequate economic and moral rights to
athletes’ personas for a limited time.  This “Crossroads Standard” will
examine two factors to determine whether an athlete has an actiona-
ble right of publicity claim: (1) whether the use of the athlete’s like-
ness is expressive or “purely commercial”23 and (2) if the use is
expressive, whether the use is “wholly unrelated” to the work or uti-
lized to intentionally mislead consumers as to the athlete’s endorse-
ment of the use or work.24  The Crossroads Standard provides the
athlete with protection for ten years, allowing for one ten-year exten-
sion upon a sufficient showing of cause, after which point the publicity
rights inquiry will be limited solely to the first factor of the standard.
Part II of this Comment provides a historical background on the
right of publicity and the varying approaches to that right developed
by courts.25  Part III examines the strengths and weaknesses of the
varying state approaches to publicity rights, and sets forth a proposal
for a harmonized right of publicity standard to replace the disjointed
state approaches.26  Part IV analyzes how the Crossroads Standard
will impact right of publicity litigation.  Specifically, it examines how
cases resembling the Madden class action suit would be resolved
under that standard.27  Finally, this Comment concludes with a justifi-
cation for immediate implementation of the Crossroads Standard.28
22. See infra notes 29–141 and the accompanying text.
23. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001).
24. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
25. See infra notes 29–141 and the accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 142–217 and the accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 218–249 and the accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 250–253 and the accompanying text.
2013] SELLING YOUR SOUL AT THE CROSSROADS 91
II. BACKGROUND
A. Down to the Crossroads: The Emergence of the
Right of Publicity
The right of publicity is rooted in one of the most basic of human
interests: an individual’s right to privacy.29  Its visionaries succinctly
described it as one’s right to simply “be let alone.”30  The right of pri-
vacy was developed with commercial uses of individuals’ likenesses in
mind, and the early cases involved private persons’ interests in not
being displayed in public for advertising purposes.31
The first recognition of a right of publicity separate and distinct
from privacy rights came in 1954 with the Second Circuit’s decision in
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.32 Haelan Lab-
oratories involved the use of photographs depicting professional base-
ball players in connection with the promotion and sale of chewing
gum.33  The court rejected the defendant’s argument that “a man has
no legal interest in the publication of his picture other than his right of
privacy.”34  Instead, the court reasoned that individuals, “especially
actors and ball-players,” have a definite right to the “publicity value”
of their photograph.35  In this influential opinion, Judge Jerome Frank
first labeled the “right of publicity,” independent of the right to pri-
vacy.36  Judge Frank emphasized the commercial importance of the
right, stating that it must be “the subject of an exclusive grant which
bar[s] any other advertiser from using [the plaintiff’s] pictures.”37
Soon after Haelan Laboratories laid the foundation for the right of
publicity, Melville Nimmer published his influential work, The Right
of Publicity.38  One scholar has commented that “if Judge Frank was
the architect of a ‘right of publicity,’ then Nimmer was the first
builder.”39  Nimmer detailed the deficiencies of privacy law in protect-
29. Madow, supra note 9, at 167.
30. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890).
31. See Roberta R. Kwall, A Perspective on Human Dignity, the First Amendment, and the
Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1345, 1351 (2009) (“These privacy decisions thus supported
the proposition that those wishing to capitalize upon another’s name or likeness for advertising
purposes should not be free to do so without compensating the principal.”); see also Madow,
supra note 9, at 167 (“The right of privacy . . . received its initial legal recognition instead in
connection with the unauthorized advertising use of names and likenesses.”).
32. Kwall, supra note 31, at 1351; see also Madow, supra note 9, at 172.
33. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cir. 1953).
34. Id. at 868.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Melville Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954).
39. MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 1:27.
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ing the commercial value of an individual’s identity, a value that he
termed a person’s publicity value.40 The Right of Publicity definitively
separated the individual rights of publicity and privacy, and became
the first stone upon which the estate of publicity rights would be
built.41
A number of commentators and courts also tout William Prosser’s
formulation of the four distinct privacy torts in his 1960 seminal work,
Privacy, as the source of the eventual creation of the right of publicity
separate from the right of privacy.42  Prosser identified four privacy
torts embodied within the overarching right of privacy.43  It was the
third of these privacy torts, misappropriation of name or likeness,
which is credited by some as being the starting point for the right of
publicity we know today.44
Whatever its origins, the right of publicity has become a widely ac-
cepted doctrine in the law today.  As of 2013, over half of the fifty
states have come to recognize a statutory or common law form of the
right of publicity.45
B. Different Devils, Different Deals: The Many Approaches to
Publicity Rights
The Supreme Court has addressed the right of publicity only once
since the inception of the doctrine.46  In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co.,47 the plaintiff was an entertainer who regularly per-
40. Nimmer, supra note 38, at 204 (defining “publicity value” as the pecuniary worth of a
person’s identity when it is used for advertising, communications, entertainment, or other com-
mercial purposes).
41. See MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 1:27.
42. See, e.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Mo. 2003); Russell Hickey, Refash-
ioning Actual Malice: Protecting Free Speech in the Right of Publicity Era, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 1101, 1105 (2006).
43. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (identifying the torts of
public disclosure of private facts; false light publication; misappropriation of name, likeness and
picture; and intrusion).
44. In Doe v. TCI Cablevision, the Supreme Court of Missouri credited Prosser’s “misappro-
priation of name” tort with giving rise to the similar right of publicity tort. TCI Cablevision, 110
S.W.3d at 368 (Mo. 2003).  The court also opined that, although the two are separate torts, the
elements of misappropriation of name and of right of publicity are “essentially the same.” Id.
45. Susannah M. Rooney, Note, Just Another Brown-Eyed Girl: Toward a Limited Federal
Right of Publicity Under the Lanham Act in a Digital Age of Celebrity Dominance, 86 S. CAL. L.
REV. 921, 933 (2013).  Of the states that recognize publicity rights, some have statutory protec-
tions for publicity rights in place, others implement common law approaches to publicity rights,
and still others use some combination of the two. See id.; see also Jeremy Wale, Comment,
Adequate Protection of Professional Athletes’ Publicity Rights: A Federal Statute Is the Only An-
swer, 11 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 248, 249–50 (2009).
46. Kwall, supra note 31, at 1355.
47. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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formed a “human cannonball” routine in a local county fair.48  One
evening, a reporter for the defendant broadcasting company attended
the fair and recorded the plaintiff’s fifteen-second performance, the
entirety of which the defendant then aired on that evening’s nightly
newscast.49  The entertainer sued for damages under Ohio’s right of
publicity doctrine, alleging that the broadcasting company aired and
commercialized his act without consent, which constituted an unlawful
appropriation of his personal property.50
The U.S. Supreme Court took the case after the Ohio Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment protected the broadcasting
company from liability for infringement of the Ohio right of publicity
law.51  The Court held that the broadcasting company was not pro-
tected from liability by virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.52  The Court suggested that the tension between the First
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of expression and the right of
publicity’s guarantee of control over the use of one’s own identity may
in some instances be resolved in favor of preserving First Amendment
freedoms.53  However, the Court rejected such First Amendment def-
erence in this case, based largely on the fact that the broadcasting
company aired the entertainer’s entire act, rather than merely his like-
ness or reputation.54  However, the First Amendment does not neces-
sarily serve to protect usurpation of the economic value of one’s
persona.55
While scholars have recognized the lasting impact of Zacchini as
requiring courts to balance First Amendment concerns and the right
of publicity,56 the Court’s opinion provides little guidance as to the
standard under which the balancing test should be conducted.57  Com-
48. Id. at 563.
49. Id. at 563–64.
50. Id. at 564.
51. Id. at 565.
52. Id. at 565–66.
53. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574–78.
54. See id. at 575 (“Much of its economic value lies in the ‘right of exclusive control over the
publicity given to his performance’; if the public can see the act free on television, it will be less
willing to pay to see it at the fair.”); see also id. at 576 (“In this case, Ohio has recognized what
may be the strongest case for a ‘right of publicity’—involving, not the appropriation of an enter-
tainer’s reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation
of the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place.”).
55. See id. at 578.
56. See Kwall, supra note 31, at 1356.
57. See MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 8:27 (“[W]hile the Zacchini . . . opinions have been
picked apart word by word by the commentators, no clear message emerges and no general rule
is discernable by which to predict the result of conflicts between the right of publicity and the
First Amendment.”).
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pounding this issue is that the right of publicity in its current form is
entirely a creature of state law and is therefore lacking any uniform
application.58  The result has been a multitude of varying tests applied
across different jurisdictions that achieve inconsistent, and often di-
rectly conflicting, results.59
At least four balancing tests concerning the right of publicity have
been applied by various courts: the “predominant purpose” test,60 the
“transformative use” test,61 the “relatedness” test,62 and the “actual
malice” test.63  In addition to these formal tests, some courts elect to
balance the right of publicity against the First Amendment through a
more general ad hoc approach.64
1. The Predominant Purpose Test
The predominant purpose test was characterized by one commenta-
tor as the “fairest way to approach [right of publicity] issues” because
it focuses the analysis on one simple question: “What is being ex-
ploited?”65  This test was most notably applied by the Supreme Court
of Missouri in Doe v. TCI Cablevision.66
The plaintiff in TCI Cablevision, Tony Twist, was a professional
hockey player who had acquired a widespread reputation as a ruthless
and violent “enforcer.”67  Twist brought a claim for misappropriation
of his identity against the defendant, Todd McFarlane, creator of the
comic book series Spawn.68  The dispute stemmed from McFarlane’s
creation of a villainous mob “enforcer” character allegedly modeled
after Twist.69  McFarlane’s character, “Anthony ‘Tony Twist’ Twis-
58. See Roberta R. Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and
Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 52–53 (1994); see also Wale, supra note 45, at 249–50.
59. Compare Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003) (holding that the defendant’s use
of popular musicians as inspiration for comic book villains was protected by the First Amend-
ment) with Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (holding that the defendant’s use
of a professional hockey player as inspiration for a comic book villain was not protected by the
First Amendment).
60. See infra notes 65–75 and the accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 77–97 and the accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 98–118 and the accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 119–129 and the accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 131–140 and the accompanying text.
65. Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free
Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2003).
66. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
67. Id. at 366.  Enforcers are players “whose chief responsibility [is] to protect goal scorers
from physical assaults,” a job that the plaintiff accomplished with an arsenal of “notorious . . .
violent tactics.” Id.
68. Id. at 365–66.
69. Id. at 366.
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telli,” shared the same name as the plaintiff Twist, and McFarlane ad-
mitted that Twist was the inspiration behind the creation of the
character.70  The character bore no physical resemblance to Twist and
they shared no similarities except the name and the outward “en-
forcer” persona.71
The court adopted the predominant purpose test to determine
whether the First Amendment protected McFarlane’s use of Twist as
inspiration for his villain.  According to the court:
If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the commer-
cial value of an individual’s identity, that product should be held to
violate the right of publicity and not be protected by the First
Amendment, even if there is some “expressive” content in it that
might qualify as “speech” in other circumstances.72
The court favored this test as a more balanced approach in cases
where speech is “both expressive and commercial.”73
Applying the test, the court held that McFarlane’s use of Twist’s
likeness was not entitled to First Amendment protection.74  Despite
McFarlane’s use of some expressive elements, the work was ultimately
motivated by a desire to profit from Twist’s likeness.75  The predomi-
nant purpose test continues to be invoked by right of publicity
plaintiffs.76
2. The Transformative Use Test
The Supreme Court of California developed and applied what it
termed the transformative use test in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc.77  That test has subsequently found favor with a
number of courts, including federal district courts in the Third and
Ninth Circuits.78
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 374 (quoting Lee, supra note 65, at 500).
73. Id. (rejecting the “relatedness” and “transformative” tests for failing to adequately con-
sider the dual nature of many uses of a person’s identity).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 371–74.  The court noted the fact that the defendant marketed his products directly
to hockey fans, as well as the defendant’s statements that readers “will continue to see current
and past hockey players’ names in [his] books,” as evidence supporting its ruling.  Id. at 371.
76. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153 (3d Cir. 2013); Kirby v. Sega of Am.,
Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
77. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
78. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D.N.J. 2011), rev’d, Hart v. Elec. Arts,
Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL
530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010), aff’d sub nom., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).  For an analysis of the respective courts’
application of the test in these cases, see infra notes 87–97, 111 and the accompanying text.
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The defendant in Comedy III was an artist who specialized in char-
coal drawings of celebrities.79  At issue in this case was the artist’s sale
of one of his drawings, a charcoal rendering of the Three Stooges, on
lithographic prints and t-shirts.80  The plaintiff, the registered owner of
all rights to the Three Stooges, sued the artist for damages and injunc-
tive relief pursuant to the California right of publicity statute.81
In attempting to distinguish between protected works of expression
and nonprotected commercial uses of likeness, the court detailed its
transformative use test.82  The principle inquiry under this approach is
“whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original
creation, or instead adds something new . . . [that] alter[s] the first
work with new expression, meaning, or message.”83  Essentially, the
author must make something “recognizably his own” by adding some
nontrivial aspect of expression.84  Further, if the “marketability and
economic value” of the defendant’s use derive “principally from some
source other than the fame of the celebrity” the use may be found to
be sufficiently transformative.85  Applying this standard, the court
found that the artist’s works were not sufficiently transformative to
warrant First Amendment protection.86
More recently, the Third Circuit applied the Comedy III test to
evaluate the use of athletes’ likenesses in video games.87  In Hart v.
Electronic Arts, Inc., the court applied a modified Comedy III ap-
proach to the transformative use test to reverse the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the video game developer.88
To determine whether the use was sufficiently transformative, the
court focused on the actual depiction of the athlete in the work rather
than the use in the context of the work as a whole.89  The court held
that the use of the plaintiff athlete’s appearance and biographical in-
79. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 800.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 807–08.
83. Id. at 808 (internal quotation marks omitted).
84. Id. at 810 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Comedy III Prods., 25 P.3d at 810.
86. Id. at 811 (reasoning that “[plaintiff’s] undeniable skill is manifestly subordinated to the
overall goal of creating literal, conventional depictions” and that “the marketability and eco-
nomic value of [defendant’s] work derives primarily from the fame of the celebrities depicted”).
87. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010),
aff’d sub nom., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d
1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
88. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 165–70 (3d Cir. 2013).
89. See id. at 163 (stating that the test “requires a more circumscribed inquiry, focusing on the
specific aspects of a work that speak to whether it was merely created to exploit a celebrity’s
likeness”).
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formation constituted a misappropriation of his likeness that was un-
protected by the First Amendment.90  EA argued that the other
creative elements of the game were so numerous that the work as a
whole was transformative.  The court was unpersuaded, finding in-
stead that the game’s other expressive features were wholly unrelated
elements that were irrelevant to the inquiry of transformativeness.91
The court was concerned only with the use of the individual’s likeness
alone, rather than focusing on the use in the context of the entire
work.92
The Hart approach was adopted and expanded upon by the Ninth
Circuit.  In In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness License Lit-
igation,93 a former college football athlete claimed that EA imple-
mented unauthorized likenesses of collegiate athletes in its NCAA
Football video game series.94  The court held that EA’s depiction of
athletes in its video game was not a sufficiently transformative work
warranting First Amendment protection.95  The court reasoned that
the athlete was depicted as what he was—the starting quarterback for
Arizona State University—and in a setting identical to where he was
found during his collegiate career—on a football field.96  According to
the court, the depiction of the athlete fell well short of being suffi-
ciently “transmogrified,” as was contemplated by the Comedy III
court in formulating the test.97
3. The Relatedness Test
The relatedness standard is rooted in the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition, which states that “if the name or likeness is used
solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the identified
person, the user may be subject to liability for a use of the other’s
identity in advertising.”98  The doctrine embodied in the Restatement
90. Id. at 170–71.
91. Id. at 169.
92. Id. at 141 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
93. Formerly Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.
94. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268, 1272
(9th Cir. 2013).  While no athletes were specifically named within the games, the defendant took
a number of steps designed to portray the real-life athletes as accurately as possible, including
using the correct jersey numbers, background information, and similar physical characteristics of
the digital athletes’ real-life counterparts. Id.
95. Id. at 1271.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 1276 (quoting Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 911 (9th Cir. 2009).
98. Kwall, supra note 31, at 1360–61 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 47 cmt. C (1995)).
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was expanded upon and articulated in the form of a two-pronged re-
latedness analysis by the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi.99
In Rogers, the plaintiff, Ginger Rogers, brought suit against the pro-
ducers of the film Ginger and Fred.100  The film tells the story of two
young Italian cabaret singers who, through imitation of Rogers and
her frequent film partner Fred Astaire, come to be known by the
names of Fred and Ginger.101  Though Rogers’s suit was primarily
based on an alleged violation of the Lanham Act, she also claimed
that the use of her name in the title and screenplay of the film violated
her right of publicity.102
To address the right of publicity claim, the court implemented a
broader version of its two-pronged analysis for determining violations
under the Lanham Act.103  After initially finding the work in question
to be expressive, the court concluded that the right of publicity should
not bar the use of a celebrity’s name or likeness unless: (1) the use is
wholly unrelated to the underlying work; or (2) the use was “simply a
disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or ser-
vices.”104  In other words, the use will be barred if it explicitly mis-
leads consumers as to the individual’s endorsement of the use or
underlying work.105  Applying this two-pronged approach, the court
held that the use of Rogers’s name in the movie title was not barred
by the right of publicity.106  The court found that merely because the
characters of the film were nicknamed “Ginger” and “Fred,” the use
of Rogers’s name was not “arbitrarily chosen just to exploit the pub-
licity value of [Rogers]” and could not be said to be wholly unrelated
to the work.107  In considering the second prong, the court determined
that the title contained no explicit indication that Rogers had any in-
volvement in the film.108  The risk that at most “some members of the
public would draw the incorrect inference that Rogers had some in-
volvement in the film” was “so outweighed by the artistic expression
99. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
100. Id. at 997.
101. Id. at 996–97.
102. Id. at 997.
103. Id. at 1004.  In determining whether a defendant’s use of a person’s likeness constitutes a
misappropriation under the Lanham Act, the court considers (1) whether the challenged work
has any relevance to the underlying work, and (2) if relevant, whether the challenged work
misleads the consumer as to the source or content of the work. See id. at 999.
104. Id.
105. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.
106. Id. at 1004–05 (holding that “the title ‘Ginger and Fred’ is clearly related to the content
of the movie and is not a disguised advertisement for the sale of goods or services”).
107. Id. at 1001.
108. Id.
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as to preclude” a finding of liability for a violation of the plaintiff’s
right of publicity.109
The Rogers relatedness test is most often utilized in conjunction
with misappropriation claims brought under the Lanham Act.110
However, a number of courts have applied this two-pronged analysis
in right of publicity actions, particularly in cases involving the use of
athletes’ likenesses in video games, such as in Brown v. Electronic
Arts, Inc.111
In Brown a former player in the National Football League brought
a right of publicity claim against the defendant video game producer
for implementing his likeness into its Madden video game without his
consent.112  Similar to the use of the collegiate athletes’ likenesses in
Keller, the player’s name was not attached to his digital counterpart,
but the game did include accurate physical characteristics and “nearly
identical” statistical information as the real-life plaintiff.113
Upon its initial determination that Madden was an expressive
work,114 the court applied a Rogers analysis to EA’s use of the
player’s likeness in the game.115  The court determined that, under the
first prong, the use of the player’s likeness was “not completely irrele-
vant” to the content of the underlying football video game.116  The
court found the second prong unsatisfied because the alleged use of
the player’s likeness as an anonymous and misnumbered avatar could
109. Id.
110. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 791–93 (D.N.J. 2011), rev’d, Hart v. Elec.
Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
111. Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09-CV-1598, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 23, 2009), aff’d, 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc.,
No. 1:09 CV 1236, 2011 WL 2457678, at *4 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) (noting that the court
“would have analyzed [plaintiff’s right of publicity] claim under Rogers” had it not already been
dismissed on other grounds); Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 793, rev’d, Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d
141 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying the two-pronged Rogers analysis and holding that the defendant
video game producer’s use of collegiate athletes’ likenesses in the game was protected by the
First Amendment).
112. Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387, at *2.
113. Id. at *4.
114. Id. at *8–12.
115. Id. at *8–15 (explaining that the creative elements and processes that the game’s creators
put into it make Madden NFL an expressive work “akin to any expressive painting that depicts
celebrity athletes of past and present in a realistic sporting environment”).  To be sure, Brown
involved a challenge to the use of the athlete’s likeness under the Lanham Act, rather than a
right of publicity claim. Id. at *4.  However, because the facts of Brown are practically indistin-
guishable from those that would arise under a right of publicity challenge to use of athletes’
images in video games, and because the Rogers test would be applied in the same manner to
such a case, it is still illustrative to analyze this case in the right of publicity context. See Plain-
tiff’s Class Action Complaint, supra note 17; cf. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004–05 (2d
Cir. 1989).
116. Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387, at *12.
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not be understood by any rational consumer as an explicit attempt to
mislead consumers.117  Thus, under the Rogers analysis, EA’s use of
the player’s likeness in its video game was protected by the First
Amendment.118
4. The Actual Malice Test
The actual malice standard was developed as one court’s attempt to
transform the law governing celebrities’ publicity rights to more
closely resemble the law regarding defamation of public figures.119
The Ninth Circuit was the first court to apply the actual malice stan-
dard from New York Times v. Sullivan to a right of publicity case.120
That standard predicates liability on a defendant’s knowledge of fal-
sity or a reckless disregard for the truth.
In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., the defendant magazine
published a fashion-focused article containing a number of celebrity
photographs.121  The photos were famous film stills altered to make it
appear that the actors were clothed in the season’s fashions.122  The
last photo in the article was a still of Dustin Hoffman from the movie
“Tootsie” clothed in a red sequined dress, but altered so that his head
was superimposed on a different body wearing a different dress.123
Hoffman sued the magazine, alleging a misappropriation of his name
and likeness in violation of California’s right of publicity doctrine.124
The court prefaced its analysis by noting that the question of actual
malice would not arise in many right of publicity cases because chal-
lenged uses would most frequently occur in “purely commercial” con-
texts.125  In the case of expressive works, or works in which “any
commercial aspects are inextricably entwined with expressive ele-
ments,” the actual malice rule applies.126
117. Id. at *14. The court initially expressed reservations as to whether the plaintiff’s likeness
was used at all.
118. Id.
119. Kwall, supra note 31, at 1360.
120. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001); see also New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–280 (1964).
121. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1183.
122. Id.
123. Id. In the film, Hoffman plays a male actor who, in order to get a part on a television
program, dresses as a woman. Id. at 1182.
124. Id. at 1183.
125. Id. at 1184–85 (“The core notion of commercial speech is that it does no more than
propose a commercial transaction.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983))).
126. Id. at 1185 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Next, the court found the challenged photo of Hoffman to be ex-
pressive for purposes of a right of publicity analysis.127  Applying the
actual malice standard, the court held that Hoffman failed to demon-
strate that the magazine knew, or purposely avoided knowing, that the
photo would mislead readers into thinking they were seeing the plain-
tiff’s body in the photo.128  At most, the magazine unknowingly misled
readers into such belief, which was insufficient to prove actual mal-
ice.129  Though this standard has not been widely adopted, it has been
advocated by some scholars as the best approach to the right of
publicity.130
5. The Ad Hoc Approach
Some courts have shunned the four traditional tests in favor of a
case-by-case approach.131  This ad hoc approach to the right of public-
ity requires a court to consider the individual facts of a particular case
to balance the competing interests of the plaintiff’s rights in her pub-
licity value and the public’s right to unfettered free expression under
the First Amendment.132
The Eighth Circuit recently undertook an ad hoc right of publicity
analysis in C.B.C. Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League
Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.133  In C.B.C. Distribution, the defen-
dant, Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., claimed that the
plaintiff’s unlicensed use of the names and statistics of professional
baseball players for its fantasy baseball products violated the publicity
rights of those athletes.134  The court determined first that the defen-
127. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185–86 (“[The defendant] did not use Hoffman’s image in a tradi-
tional advertisement printed merely for the purpose of selling a particular product.”).
128. Id. at 1187–89.
129. Id. (“There is not actual malice where journalists unknowingly mislead the public.” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 1188 (“While [defendant] never explicitly told its
readers that the [plaintiff] did not pose for the . . . photographs . . . there is certainly no clear and
convincing evidence in the magazine itself that [defendant] intended to suggest the opposite
. . . .”).
130. See generally Hickey, supra note 42.
131. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. MLB Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996) (balancing the
interests, policies, and justifications for First Amendment protection against those for enforcing
the right of publicity of professional baseball players); see also ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc.,
332 F.3d 915, 936 (6th Cir. 2003) (balancing elements of the “actual malice,” “transformative
use,” and “relatedness” tests in a case involving a work of art incorporating the image of a
professional golfer).
132. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972.
133. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir.
2007).
134. Id. at 820.  C.B.C. initially brought the action, seeking a declaratory judgment to establish
its right to use the names and statistics of baseball players without paying for licenses. Id.  The
major league baseball players had previously licensed their publicity rights to Advanced Media
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dant adequately alleged evidence to establish a right of publicity viola-
tion,135  but still found that the specific facts and circumstances of the
case tipped the balance in favor of the plaintiff’s First Amendment
right of expression.136  The court concluded that the economic justifi-
cations for protecting the publicity rights of athletes simply did not
measure up to the significant goal of encouraging and protecting pub-
lic access and expression under the First Amendment.137
The ad hoc approach has been criticized as being “unhelpful,”138
“unpredictable,”139 and as “amount[ing] to no more than an ‘I know it
when I see it’ approach.”140  At least one scholar has argued that the
uncertainties inherent in the ad hoc approach would cause a chilling
effect as users would forgo potentially harmless uses for fear of the
unpredictable result of an ad hoc analysis.141  Because such an ap-
proach embodies all of the negatives that the Crossroads Standard
seeks to rectify, this Comment will not consider the ad hoc approach
in formulating that standard.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standin’ at the Crossroads, Tryin’ to Flag a Ride: The Dangers
of a Non-Uniform Right of Publicity Standard
The devil has made numerous deals over the course of history, and
he has been unwaveringly consistent.  In all his rumored dealings, the
devil has been prompt,142 unrelenting,143 and, as the untimely demise
through their association, the Major League Baseball Players Association, which allowed Ad-
vanced Media the standing to counterclaim for violation of the athletes’ rights of publicity. Id.
135. The court purportedly adopted the TCI Cablevision approach to the right of publicity,
finding that C.B.C.’s purpose in using the athlete’s statistics was for profit, and thus C.B.C. had
the “intent or purpose to obtain a commercial benefit from the use of [the players’] identity.” Id.
at 822–23 (quoting Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 370–71 (Mo. 2003)).
136. Id. at 824.
137. Professional baseball players are already lavishly compensated for their performances on
the diamond, reducing the need to “promote . . . the right of the individual to reap the rewards of
his or her endeavors and . . . to earn a living” through the enforcement of publicity rights. Id. at
824.  Conversely, C.B.C.’s interest in the use of the statistics, which are of significant public
interest in that they “allow[ ] fans to better appreciate” what is recognized by the court as “the
national pastime,” garners significant First Amendment justification as protected expression. Id.
at 823.
138. Kwall, supra note 31, at 1363 (“The court in C.B.C. Distribution . . . performed a similarly
unhelpful analysis . . . .”).
139. MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 8:23 (“[T]here is no rule to be applied, there is only the
unrestrained and unpredictable judicial balancing of competing values.”).
140. Id.
141. Lee, supra note 65, at 500–01.
142. CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE, DOCTOR FAUSTUS 81 (Sylvan Barnet ed., Signet Classic 2001)
(1588) (the devil collected Faust’s soul at midnight on the day their deal expired).
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of Robert Johnson proves, he nearly always collects on a debt.144  In
stark contrast, the right of publicity and the fulfillment of the meta-
phorical deals athletes make with the public devil have been wholly
inconsistent.
The main problem with the right of publicity is that it is largely a
creature of state law, with each jurisdiction creating its own standards
and rules for enforcing the right.145  As discussed in Part II.B, at least
four liability tests have arisen out of the jurisdictions that recognize a
right of publicity, and a number of other jurisdictions have opted for
an ad hoc form of analysis.146  Courts and state legislatures are divided
not only over what test to apply to resolve right of publicity claims,
but also over whether to codify the right,147 whether the right is de-
scendible,148 and whether to recognize a right of publicity at all.149
As one scholar noted, the lack of judicial consistency in the realm of
right of publicity does not threaten the existence or viability of the
right itself amongst the rapidly growing number of jurisdictions that
recognize it.150  However, the problems created by inconsistent doc-
trines governing publicity rights have the potential to harm litigants
and the judicial system as a whole, just as would an outright abolition
of the right.151  By failing to address the jurisdictional discrepancies
and conflicting outcomes, litigants will be exposed to problems of fo-
rum shopping,152 continuing judicial confusion,153 and inconsistent
and unpredictable litigation.154
143. After attempting to renege on his deal with Satan, Tom Walker tried to avoid the ulti-
mate debt collector by carrying two bibles on his person at all times. CHARLES MONTGOMERY
SKINNER, The Devil and Tom Walker, in 1 MYTHS AND LEGENDS OF OUR OWN LAND 275, 278
(Phil., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1896).
144. This author is aware of one instance in which it is told that the devil was bested and sent
away from an attempted collection empty handed.  The irony of the fact that Daniel Webster,
the man who defeated Satan, was acting as a lawyer does not go unnoticed. See STEPHEN VIN-
CENT BENE´T, THE DEVIL AND DANIEL WEBSTER (1937).
145. Lee, supra note 65, at 488.
146. See supra Part II.B.1–5.
147. Lee, supra note 65, at 478–79.
148. Kwall, supra note 58, at 81–82.
149. Id. at 52–53.
150. Id.
151. Professor Kwall asserts that the jurisdictional inconsistencies are inconsequential because
the courts have “a relatively uniform way of analyzing these questions, even if the outcomes of
particular cases are somewhat inconsistent.” Id. at 53.  However, a number of instances reveal
not just “somewhat inconsistent” case resolutions, but outcomes that are diametrically opposed
based on very similar facts. Compare, e.g., Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003), with
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003).
152. Wale, supra note 45 at 255–59.
153. Lee, supra note 65.
154. Compare Winter, 69 P.3d 473, with TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363.
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B. Falling Down on Your Knees: A Proper Standard
While each of the existing tests developed by courts in right of pub-
licity contexts has some merit, none of them solves all of the problems
that persist with the right in its modern form.  The Crossroads Stan-
dard provides a workable alternative that can be applied universally
to curtail the rapid expansion of the right of publicity, while simulta-
neously providing professional athletes with consistent protection
from commercial exploitation of their likenesses.  This is accom-
plished through a two-factor test to determine whether an athlete has
an actionable right of publicity claim against the use of her persona.
The two factors are: (1) whether the use is expressive or purely com-
mercial; and (2) if the use is expressive, whether the use is wholly
unrelated to the work or utilized to intentionally mislead consumers
as to the athlete’s endorsement of the use or work.  The Crossroads
Standard provides the athlete with this level of protection for a period
of ten years, with the possibility for one ten-year extension upon a
sufficient showing of cause, after which point the publicity rights in-
quiry will be limited solely to the first factor.
1. The First Factor: The Hoffman Approach to the Commercial vs.
Expressive Determination
The initial inquiry under the Crossroads Standard, as with any right
of publicity action, asks whether the challenged appropriation of the
likeness is commercial or expressive in nature.155  Every court that ad-
dressed publicity rights has recognized that “expressive” works are
generally entitled to broader protection under the First Amendment,
while works utilizing a person’s identity for “purely commercial pur-
poses” are generally unprotected and render the author liable for the
unauthorized use of a person’s identity.156  Rather than ending the
analysis here, each approach—except the Hoffman standard—adds
extraneous elements to the expressive–commercial determination that
only serve to confound the findings, excessively enlarge the scope of
publicity rights protection, and create confusing and diametrically op-
posed case rulings.
In light of these problems, the Crossroads Standard adopts the ap-
proach to the expressive–commercial distinction articulated by the
Hoffman court: whether the challenged use of the athlete’s persona
155. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 373.
156. See id.; see also Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (9th Cir.
2001); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F. 2d 994, 1003–05 (2d Cir. 1989); Winter, 69 P.3d at 477.
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“do[es] no more than propose a commercial transaction.”157  Under
this approach, the use of an athlete’s persona “entirely and directly for
the purpose of selling a product” would constitute an actionable right
of publicity claim.158  If, however, the use serves some other expres-
sive purpose, the work will be entitled to broader First Amendment
protection and, contingent upon satisfaction of the second half of the
Crossroads Standard, will not be subject to liability for appropriating
the athlete’s likeness.159  In short, the use of the athlete’s likeness is
not immediately actionable unless it serves no other discernable pur-
pose than to shill a product or service.160  This approach eliminates the
uncertainty that plagues “weighing and balancing” tests utilized by
other courts, providing a proper threshold consideration in the right of
publicity context.161
The expressive–commercial analysis adopted by the Hoffman court
illustrates the desired balance between the athlete’s interest in the
commerciality of her persona and the public’s interest in unfettered
expressive access to its heroes.  The right of publicity was specifically
created to serve the athlete’s interest in the use of her identity and
likeness for commercial purposes.162  Judge Frank justified the exis-
tence of this newly created right by reasoning:
For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons (espe-
cially . . . ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised
through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely de-
prived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertise-
ments . . . displayed in newspapers, magazines, buses, trains and
subways.163
The advertising use of an athlete’s identity, noted by Judge Frank as
the reason behind the right of publicity, is exactly the type of use that
would constitute an actionable claim under the Hoffman standard.164
157. Hoffman, 225 F.3d at 1185–86 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 1185.
159. See id. at 1184–85.
160. This admittedly low standard also serves to emphasize the Crossroads Standard’s focus
on protecting the non-commercial use of a public figure’s likeness by providing a sort of escape
valve for expressive users to avoid costly and burdensome litigation.  In this way, the first prong
of the Crossroads Standards serves a similar purpose as the various state anti-SLAPP (Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation) statutes. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“[T]he anti-SLAPP motion is designed to protect the defendant from having to liti-
gate meritless cases aimed at chilling First Amendment expression . . . .”).
161. See supra Part II.B.1–3, 5.
162. MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 1:26.
163. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 858 (2d Cir. 1953).
164. The Hoffman court cited a number of examples of uses that would qualify as “purely
commercial” uses that would be entitled to the thinnest level of protection, including the use of a
baseball player’s image in a print advertisement in Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686,
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The Hoffman “pure commercial use” approach allows for these
uses—the quintessential violations of one’s right of publicity—to be
quickly filtered out from protection without sacrificing the First
Amendment’s right of expression.  Fulfilling this balancing task, the
standard recognizes that the expressive character of a use properly
outweighs commerciality that may exist in the work as well.165  Such
an approach allows the athlete to effectively control the commercial
exploitation of her image, while simultaneously limiting her right to
prevent any use, commercial or otherwise, that evokes her image.166
The Hoffman court properly understood and incorporated the laws
favoring the First Amendment over the individual interests of those in
the public eye.167  In short, the Hoffman court was in tune with the
notion that professional athletes bargain with the public for notoriety
and fortune, and they must repay that debt with unfettered public ac-
cess to their image for expressive purposes.  Without the adoration,
attention, and monetary support of the public that makes them fa-
mous, the professional athlete is nothing more than a lonely soul at
the crossroads, sitting in the dirt and waiting for a deal that will never
come.168
As at least one commentator has aptly noted, the main issue with
the extraneous expressive–commercial considerations made by the
predominant use, transformative use, and the relatedness tests is that
they each require courts to undertake a subjective analysis of the artis-
691 (9th Cir. 1998), and the use of a basketball star’s birth name in a television commercial in
Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1996). Hoffman, 255 F.3d at
1185.
165. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185–86.  A use will still be considered expressive in character if
any commercial aspects of the work are “inextricably entwined with expressive elements, and so
they cannot be separated out from the fully protected whole.” Id. at 1185  (internal quotation
marks omitted).
166. This aspect of the approach would serve to quell Judge Kozinski’s primary issue with the
right of publicity as it has evolved over time.  In his prominent dissent from the majority decision
in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Judge Kozinski chastised a view of the right that
imposes liability on advertisers and authors of expressive works who merely “remind the public
of a celebrity.”  White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d. 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinksi, J., dissenting).  The Crossroads Standard, through application of the Hoffman expres-
sive–commercial distinction, attempts to reign in this “Orwellian” overprotection of publicity
rights. Id.
167. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (noting that First Amendment
protection is greater for expression concerning “those who, by reason of their achievements or
the vigor and success by which they seek the public’s attention, are properly classified as public
figures”); see also Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669–70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(listing “the extent to which the individual voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety”
as a factor in determining the newsworthiness element in an invasion of privacy action).
168. See Crawly, supra note 11 (“If we don’t watch, Alex Rodriguez is selling ladies shoes at
Neiman Marcus.  If we don’t watch, Chase Utley is selling cars.  If we don’t watch, Cole Hamels
is a barista at Starbucks.”).
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tic merit, worth, and effort of the work to determine its character.169
These “merit-based” analyses are generally disfavored in many areas
of law170 and should particularly be avoided in cases involving the de-
termination of the aesthetic or creative merit of expression.171
An additional problem with the expressive–commercial determina-
tions set forth by these tests is their potential to have a serious chilling
effect on expression and creation.  This is best evidenced by the pre-
dominant use test in Doe v. TCI Cablevision.  The use of Tony Twist’s
persona as the basis for a comic book character was arguably more
than expressive enough to warrant First Amendment protection for
the author,172 yet the court found that the author’s “intent to gain a
commercial advantage” outweighed the high level of expressiveness
within the work.173  The court based its determination on findings that
the author admittedly based the character off of Twist and promised
that readers would “continue to see current and past players’ names in
his books.”174
It is entirely plausible that if the Missouri Supreme Court’s reason-
ing in TCI Cablevision were to become the norm, it would stifle crea-
tivity and the creation of memorable characters meant to invoke the
image of certain celebrities.  Countless memorable characters in car-
toon history were modeled in voice, if not in total look and feel, after
famous comedians and television stars.175  Had the creators of these
169. Hickey, supra note 42, at 1117; see also Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374
(Mo. 2003) (analyzing the “literary value” of the comic book character based on Tony Twist in
determining that the work was primarily commercial in nature); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d
473, 477 (Cal. 2003) (evaluating the “artistic expression” and “form” of the work to determine its
commercial or expressive nature).
170. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219–20 (2011) (declining to incorporate an evalua-
tion of the value or emotional impact of speech in determining the breadth of First Amendment
protection); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (refusing to
take the further step of subjectively evaluating the quality of a parody in determining whether a
fair use defense was applicable).
171. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (“It would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges
of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”).
172. “Tony Twist” the comic book character bore no physical resemblance to the real life
Twist, nor was the character “about” him.  TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 370; see also Winter,
69 P.3d at 477–80 (upholding the use of two rock musicians as the bases for comic book villains
as sufficiently expressive under virtually identical circumstances as those giving rise to the action
in TCI Cablevision).
173. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 371–74.
174. Id. at 371.
175. For example, Jabberjaw, a talking cartoon shark and star of the show of the same name,
was clearly meant to evoke the image and persona of the Three Stooges’ Curly Howard, see
Cartoon Network: Dept. of Cartoons, http://web.archive.org/web/19990210172244/http://www.
cartoonnetwork.com/doc/jabberjaw/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2012); Johnny Bravo, the
muscle-bound dimwitted star of a late-nineties Cartoon Network show, borrows his mannerisms
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animated icons faced the risk of liability merely because they may
have “create[d] the impression that [the person] was somehow associ-
ated with” the character,176 the creators may have opted instead to
take the safer route and forgo creation altogether.  The law has long
shown a preference for avoiding the chilling of First Amendment ex-
pression concerning figures of public prominence such as celebrities
and professional athletes.177
2. The Second Factor: The Two-Pronged Rogers Test
Say what you will about the devil, but he has proven through centu-
ries of bargaining that he will honor the consideration that he owes to
his debtors.  He does not “stiff” them or try to collect early based on a
contractual loophole.178  Similarly, the public devil must be fair in its
dealings with the athlete before it may reap the benefits of the deal.  It
is for this reason that the Crossroads Standard inquiry does not end
with a determination of the commercial or expressive nature of the
challenged use of an athlete’s persona.  Were an expressive use abso-
lutely protected by virtue of it bearing some non-commercial element,
the right of publicity would be so thin as to be virtually nonexistent.
In the interest of fundamental fairness to the professional athlete, a
finding that a use is expressive does not automatically entitle the user
to protection from liability.  Rather, such a finding triggers a second
step in the Crossroads Standard analysis: the two-pronged Rogers re-
latedness approach.179
Under the second factor in the Crossroads Standard, a court would
have to determine whether a use of an athlete’s persona found to be
expressive under the first factor (1) is wholly unrelated to the underly-
ing use, or (2) explicitly misleads consumers as to the endorsement of
the athlete.180  A finding in the affirmative as to either prong will re-
sult in the broad enforcement of the athlete’s publicity rights as if the
work were purely commercial.181  Conditioning First Amendment pro-
unabashedly from Elvis Presley, see Boomerang, The Woods (clip), CARTOONNETWORK.COM,
http://www.cartoonnetwork.com/tv_shows/boomerang/video/the-woods-clip.html (last visited
July 22, 2013); and The Simpsons character Professor Frink was intentionally voiced to mimic
Jerry Lewis, see CHRIS TURNER, PLANET SIMPSON: HOW A CARTOON MASTERPIECE DEFINED A
GENERATION 414 (2004).
176. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 371.
177. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (noting that state
action that deters speech because of the fear of liability creates a chilling effect that is “antitheti-
cal to the First Amendment’s protection”).
178. See supra notes 1–8, 142–144 and the sources cited therein.
179. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
180. See id.
181. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2001).
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tection for the non-“purely commercial” use of an athlete’s likeness
upon satisfaction of the Rogers test ensures that the economic and
dignitary rights of the athlete are protected, while still ensuring broad
protection for expressive works in appropriate circumstances.
The relatedness prong serves the primary purpose of ensuring that a
professional athlete may guard her sizeable publicity value182 against
appropriation for commercial gain by a work artistically and expres-
sively unrelated to the athlete.183  In these instances, where the chal-
lenged use is wholly unrelated to the athlete, the right of publicity
outweighs the First Amendment freedom of expression.184  This limi-
tation is perhaps best understood as more of a gloss or qualification
upon the expressive–commercial distinction that comprises the first
factor of the Crossroads Standard.  Even where the challenged use of
the athlete’s image is “expressive” in that it is not “purely commer-
cial,” the expressive value of the use is significantly lower where the
use is unnecessary to the underlying work.185  A challenged use that is
so unnecessary or wholly unrelated to the underlying work lacks the
expressive merit to justify usurpation of the athlete’s interest in the
commercial control of her image.186
This first prong arguably guards the athlete’s interest in her com-
mercial publicity value in another way—one that was not contem-
plated by the Rogers court.  By preventing uses of the athlete’s image
that are wholly unrelated to the underlying work, this prong preserves
the athlete’s right to explore and commercially exploit unforeseen
markets.  Both copyright187 and trademark law,188 two areas with
which the right of publicity is often paralleled, safeguard the ability of
182. Nimmer, supra note 38, at 204.
183. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1000.  The court discussed the application of the “relatedness” prong
in terms of a Lanham Act claim.
184. Id. at 1004.
185. See id. at 1000.
186. It is recognized that this form of “expressive value” analysis is strikingly similar to the
forms of analysis rejected as inappropriate for courts to engage in in Part III.B.1 of this Com-
ment. See supra notes 169–171 and the accompanying text.  However, this author is not sug-
gesting that such a merit-based analysis is never appropriate.  Indeed, such an analysis is
unavoidable, if not indispensable, if the level of protection afforded to a challenged use of an
athlete’s likeness is to be fairly determined.  Such a merit or expressive value determination is
merely inappropriate as a threshold matter, as in the first factor of the Crossroads Standard.  As
such, this approach is similar to the objective “extrinsic” and subjective “intrinsic” tests applied
in cases of alleged copyright infringement. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
187. Lee, supra note 65, at 481–88.
188. See Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp. 506, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(considering the potential that the trademark holder may enter into the market of the alleged
infringer as a factor in the “likelihood of confusion” analysis).
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the owner of the respective interest to consider and develop untapped
markets.
The second prong of the Rogers analysis serves to protect athletes
in instances where the challenged use of their personas is related to
the underlying expressive work, but used by the author to deliberately
deceive the public into believing that the athlete endorsed or was oth-
erwise involved in the use or the work.189  Where the challenged use is
“simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or
services,” the expressive value of the use is diminished and gives way
to the athlete’s commercial interest in her own persona.190
While the two prongs of the Crossroads Standard’s second factor
adequately protect the athlete from unauthorized usurpation of her
significant publicity value, they serve as a protection for the “devil’s”
interest in the deal as well.  The Rogers analysis prevents an athlete
from hiding behind her publicity rights as a means of effectively con-
trolling or silencing public expression that she finds to be unfavora-
ble.191  Discussing the relatedness standard, the Lane v. Random
House, Inc. court stated that the “[plaintiff] has devoted much time
and effort establishing himself as paladin of the conspiracists.  It is too
late for him to retreat to the sidelines as a means of shielding himself
from criticism.”192  Thus, the Lane court seemed to recognize that the
right of publicity is the product of a deal the person strikes with the
public and is necessarily limited by the public’s interest in reaping the
benefit owed to it.193  In other words, the Lane court recognized that
the devil always gets his due.
189. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004–05.
190. Id. at 1004 (quoting Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1980); see also Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“False or misleading commercial expression is not protected.”).
191. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.
192. Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 141, 147 (D.D.C. 1995).  At issue in Lane was
the use of the plaintiff’s likeness in an advertisement for a book that aimed to refute the claims
of prominent authors, plaintiff included, who questioned the Warren Commission’s conclusions
concerning the Kennedy assassination. Id. at 144–45.  The court analyzed the “relatedness” of
the use under what it termed a “newsworthiness privilege,” but the Lane court’s “no real rele-
vancy” standard was sufficiently similar in application to the Rogers “wholly unrelated” test to
warrant the comparison. Compare id. at 147, with Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004–05.
193. In the Lane case, what was “owed” to the public was the ability to use a prominent
author’s image in connection with a commentary and criticism regarding a matter of public im-
portance to which plaintiff was a major contributor. See Lane, 985 F. Supp. at 146–47.
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C. Think I’m Sinking Down: Appropriate Limitations Upon the
Duration of Publicity Right Protection
One aspect of Robert Johnson’s fateful deal with the devil is com-
mon throughout the lore of satanic bargaining: the deal is a ticking
clock.  Each party with whom the devil deals is given the power, fame,
or fortune they seek, but only for a predetermined amount of time.194
The benefits of such a system are clear: they provide the devil with
prompt and consistent enforcement of the deal’s terms, and encourage
those who deal with him to make the absolute most of the gifts be-
stowed upon them in the limited time they are given.  The same poli-
cies underlie and justify the limitation of the professional athlete’s
right of publicity protection to a predetermined period of time.
Under the Crossroads Standard, the professional athlete will be en-
titled to broader protection of her publicity rights for a period of ten
years.  Upon expiration of this initial ten-year protection term, one of
two scenarios will come to pass: (1) the broad protection will lapse
and further uses of the athlete’s identity will be subject only to the
limited purely commercial inquiry;195 or (2) if the athlete can make a
substantial “likelihood of harm” showing, she will receive one addi-
tional ten-year extension of full protection.
Under the first scenario, any further use of the athlete’s likeness
after her protection period has expired will be protected as long as it is
not purely commercial in nature.196  The justification for this signifi-
cantly lower threshold for protection is paralleled in copyright law.
Of course, copyright law protects a copyrighted work for a limited
period of time.197  Further, the fair use doctrine provides for lesser
194. Robert Johnson and Jabez Stone were given ten years of blues prowess and prosperous
farming, respectively.  Faust appears to have received the devil’s best offer, gaining twenty-four
years to enjoy the indulgences of the world. See Cracked Topics: Deals with the Devil,
CRACKED.COM, http://www.cracked.com/funny-7193-deals-with-devil/ (last visited Nov. 13,
2012).
195. One exception will continue to subject the user of an athlete’s likeness for non-“purely
commercial” uses to liability: those uses intended to harm or defame the athlete.  As the Hoff-
man court noted: “the First Amendment does not protect knowingly false speech.” Hoffman,
255 F.3d at 1186 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).  In keeping with
the limited scope of protection however, the athlete will have to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the use of her identity was done with “actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that
the use created a false impression of endorsement that would mislead the public into believing
that the athlete supported the use or work. Id. at 1186–87.
196. Id. at 1183.
197. Admittedly, the Copyright Act of 1976 provides for the much longer protection term of
the life of the author plus an additional seventy years after the author’s death.  17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) (2006).  This longer term is justified in the realm of copyrights however, because the
copyrighted work is often a primary source of monetary value or income for the author.  The
same justification is not nearly as strong in the realm of professional athletes’ publicity rights, as
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protection of works that have been previously published and commer-
cially exploited.198  In such circumstances, the allegedly infringing use
of the author’s work does not usurp the author’s valuable right of first
publication and is thus more indicative of fair use.199
Similarly, where an athlete has had a sufficient amount of time to
substantially exploit the commercial value of her identity, subsequent
expressive uses of her persona by third parties constitute a lesser usur-
pation of the athlete’s publicity value.  Ten years is an appropriate
amount of time for a professional athlete to fully exploit her commer-
cial value.  The endorsement values of top athletes decrease over ex-
tended periods of time.200  Research suggests that the way to combat
this inevitable decline in endorsement value and related sales is for
sponsors to invest heavily in “winning records,” or athletes that culti-
vate a career of continuing success.201  However, that study still warns
against lifetime or even long-term endorsement deals.202  Indeed, the
right of publicity was initially created to foster a celebrity’s control of
the commercial exploitation of her own persona—including these en-
dorsement deals.203  The initial ten-year period provides broader pro-
tection during the peak years of an athlete’s career, when she is the
most valuable as an endorsement asset, while also allowing protection
to continue through the end of the athlete’s career and into retire-
ment, when her publicity value begins to dwindle.  Ten years repre-
sents a more than adequate term of protection, as the average
professional athlete will be active for no more than approximately five
years.204
the income generated through the commercial exploitation of their personas is more often
merely supplementary to the athlete’s substantial performance salary. See C.B.C. Distrib. &
Mktg., Inc. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007).
198. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551–52 (1985).
199. See id.
200. See Anita Elberse & Jeroen Verleun, The Economic Value of Celebrity Endorsements, 52
J. ADVERTISING RESEARCH 149, 163–64 (2012).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1953).
204. The average career span for athletes in the “big four” professional sports leagues (NFL,
MLB, NBA, and NHL) hovers between three and five years.  NFL players are active for the
shortest amount of time, averaging a career of 3.5 years. The Average NFL Player, BUSINESS-
WEEK (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_06/b4214058615722.
htm.  On average, MLB players are active the longest, generally playing for about 5.6 years.
Sam Roberts, Just How Long Does the Average Baseball Career Last?, NYTIMES.COM (July 15,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/sports/baseball/15careers.html.
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Of course, there are instances where an athlete’s true endorsement
potential does not manifest until after the athlete has retired.205  It is
for these athletes that the potential for a second ten-year protection
term may be provided.  Where the athlete has cultivated a continu-
ously gainful endorsement value, the justifications for reducing public-
ity right protection are lacking.206  Accordingly, athletes may, upon a
sufficient showing of good reason, receive one additional ten-year ex-
tension of full publicity protection under the Crossroads Standard.
The factors that may be considered in determining whether to extend
the protection term include: at what level or point the athlete is in her
career;207 what position or sport the athlete plays;208 and the level of
success the athlete has had in her career.209  These factors are to be
considered in the likelihood of harm analysis and are designed to pro-
tect the athlete from unjustified usurpation of her commercial value,
provided that her value remains strong enough to outweigh the third-
party user’s interest in expression.210
The ten-year limitation of protection for athletes’ publicity rights
addresses another prominent issue in right of publicity law: descend-
ibility and posthumous application.  Many prominent scholars have
argued that the right of publicity should be descendible.211  However,
due to the intimate and personal nature of the right,212 the idea that it
could be passed down and subsequently enforced by someone other
than the athlete herself seems entirely counterintuitive.  The Cross-
205. For example, Olympic swimmer Michael Phelps, NBA legend Michael Jordan, and for-
mer PGA champion Arnold Palmer each stand to make millions of dollars annually during their
lifetimes from post-career endorsements and sponsorship deals.  Kurt Badenhausen, Michael
Phelps Locks Up Olympic Immortality and Post-Career Millions, FORBES (Aug. 1, 2012), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2012/08/01/michael-phelps-locks-up-olympic-immortalit
y-and-post-career-millions/.
206. As discussed above, the main justification for lowering the level of protection for ath-
lete’s publicity rights over time is the diminishing of their “publicity value” along with the ending
of their careers. See supra notes 200–203 and the accompanying text.  Where the athlete contin-
ues to cultivate substantial endorsement-value income however, the subsequent use of her image
by another remains as much of a usurpation of that commercial value as it would be during the
athlete’s career.
207. See Elberse & Verleun, supra note 200.
208. Sports and athletes with higher visibility are more likely to garner a higher endorsement
value.  Kathleen Farrell et al., Celebrity Performance and Endorsement Value: The Case of Tiger
Woods, 26 MANAGERIAL FINANCE 1, 12 (2000).
209. Id. (concluding that an athlete’s subsequent athletic performances and successes can have
a positive effect on the continuing commercial value of her endorsement potential).
210. See supra notes 155–56 and the accompanying text.
211. See Lee, supra note 65, at 479; see also Kwall, supra note 58, at 53.
212. See MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 1:3 (“[T]he right of publicity is simply this: it is the
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.” (em-
phasis added)).
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roads Standard would not allow for descendibility, and the term for
broader protection would automatically terminate upon the death of
the athlete.
Scholars who advocate for the descendibility and posthumous en-
forcement of publicity rights invoke a “moral rights” perspective.213
That is, publicity rights should protect the posthumous use of an ath-
lete’s persona to prevent emotional and dignitary damage to the de-
ceased, her heirs, and her descendants.214  However, the right of
publicity was created in part to counter the emphasis that the right of
privacy places on “humiliation” and dignitary harms.215  Thus, it
would be counterintuitive to adopt a scheme of descendibility culled
directly from the values and goals of privacy law that the right of pub-
licity was created to distance itself from.
Even if such reasoning were appropriately applied to the right of
publicity, it does not necessarily support an extension of the right to a
descendant of the original right holder.  The motivation behind the
descendibility argument is to protect the dignity and honor of the pub-
licity rights of the person whose identity is being appropriated.  One
simply cannot embarrass or offend the dead. De mortuis nil nisi
bonum216 may be an admirable concept from a philosophical or moral
standpoint, but it should not provide a legal basis for post-mortem
expansion of publicity rights.
If history and legend have taught us anything, it is that the devil
does not like to be kept waiting where the collection of debt is con-
cerned.217  Similarly, the greatest devil known to our earthly realm,
the sport-adoring public, should not be indefinitely denied restitution
for the gifts bestowed upon its athletes.  The Crossroads Standard en-
sures that the public gets what it is rightfully owed.
IV. IMPACT
The Crossroads Standard would bring consistency and uniformity to
right of publicity jurisprudence.  The Crossroads Standard provides a
workable means of producing consistent outcomes by eliminating the
states’ various applications of the right of publicity and reducing the
impact of judicial discretion prevalent in these approaches.  The im-
213. See Kwall, supra note 58, at 82–83.
214. Id.
215. MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 1:27; see also Nimmer, supra note 38.
216. Translation: “Of the dead (say) nothing but good.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/de%20mortuis%20nil%20nisi%20bonum (last vis-
ited Oct. 16, 2013).
217. See supra notes 142–144, 194 and the accompanying text.
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pact that the Crossroads Standard would have on publicity rights liti-
gation is best demonstrated by applying the standard to facts similar
to those of Davis v. Electronic Arts, Inc.218  It is useful to examine the
workings of the standard in this context because it is highly unlikely
that Davis will be the last of this type of litigation.  Until a workable
solution to the expansion of the right of publicity is reached, video
games—and sports video games in particular—will always be scruti-
nized for their expressive and creative uses of once great athletes.  The
Crossroads Standard provides such a solution.
In Davis, a right of publicity suit was brought by a class of retired
NFL players against EA, the makers of the popular Madden video
game series, for allegedly including unauthorized re-creations of the
players’ identities and personas within its 2009 version of the game.219
The plaintiff class claimed that EA unlawfully appropriated the play-
ers’ likenesses by including them in “historic teams,” digital re-cre-
ations of prolific teams from past NFL seasons.220  The plaintiffs
alleged that the use of the players’ likenesses in the production and
sale of the video games constituted a wrongful exploitation of their
publicity rights for commercial gain.221  While the historic players’ av-
atars are statistically representative of the actual players they purport-
edly mimic, they do not bare the true names, numbers, or physical
likenesses of their real-life counterparts.222  Under the Crossroads
Standard claims such as the one at issue in Davis must fail.223
The first determination that must be made under the Crossroads
Standard is whether the alleged use of the players’ likenesses is a com-
mercial or expressive use.224  The relevant inquiry in this instance is
whether the use of the players’ likenesses is “entirely and directly for
the purpose of selling a product,” or if the translation of statistical
values into a playable digital avatar is expressive enough to warrant
protection.225  The use of the players’ likenesses would only constitute
a commercial use if the historical teams were included in the game
218. Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint, supra note 17.
219. Id. at 2.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 5.
223. For the purposes of this example, the author will proceed upon the assumption that the
plaintiffs would be entitled to the full protection of the Crossroads Standard, as a plaintiff who
cannot satisfy the looser standards of full protection necessarily would fail to succeed under the
narrower level of protection.  In reality, there is some doubt as to whether these plaintiffs would
qualify for full protection under the Crossroads Standard, as most have been retired for many
years. See supra Part III.C.
224. See supra Part III.B.1.
225. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001).
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solely “for the purpose of selling” the Madden video game.226  This
was not the case with EA’s decision to include former players and
historical teams in its game.
One would expect, pursuant to the most basic of marketing princi-
ples, that an effort “solely for the purpose of selling a product” would
be at the forefront of the promotional efforts designed to sell that
particular product.  However, a detailed look at the rear cover of the
Madden box, a common means of informing potential consumers of
the selling points of the particular game, reveals no mention of the
inclusion of historic teams or former players.227  The official advertise-
ment for the game similarly lacks any reference to the inclusion of the
retired players at any point during its approximately two-minute run-
time.228  Surely, a feature that is not even mentioned in the promo-
tional materials designed to spur consumer interest in the game
cannot be considered “entirely and directly for the purpose of selling
[the] product.”229
Conversely, there are expressive elements to the challenged use
that would serve to outweigh whatever commercial character the use
may have.  At least one court has noted, the Madden video games use
creative and expressive means in order to achieve their goal of realisti-
cally replicating NFL football games.230  The plaintiff class’s argument
that the games strive for realism and precise replication of NFL foot-
ball231 is insufficient to negate the creativity and expression required
to successfully achieve those goals.232  Thus, the use of the retired
players’ likenesses in Madden constitutes a use within an expressive
work, and the plaintiff class has failed to establish an actionable case
under the first prong of the Crossroads Standard.
The plaintiff class may still be able to prove a violation of the right
of publicity by EA by satisfying the second prong of the Crossroads
Standard.233  Under the second prong, the challenged appropriation of
the players’ identities will be actionable if: (1) the use is wholly unre-
226. Id.
227. Back Cover, MADDEN NFL 09 (EA Sports 2008), available at http://cache.kotaku.com/
assets/images/kotaku/2008/08/Madden09PSP.jpg.
228. VISO Games, Madden 09 (NFL) – Official Trailer, YOUTUBE (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=5bzcvRk67_4.
229. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185.
230. Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09-CV-1598, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387, at *11 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 23, 2009), aff’d, 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013).
231. Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint, supra note 17, at 4.
232. Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387, at *11 (“That the designers used a realistic sports
theme to express their creativity . . . does not change the fact that the Madden NFL games
manifest their designers’ creative vision.”).
233. See supra Part III.B.2.
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lated to the creation of the Madden video game; or (2) the use explic-
itly misleads purchasers of the game into believing that the athletes
have endorsed the game.234  Again, the plaintiff class in Davis cannot
establish either of these factors.
Satisfaction of the first factor of this prong requires that the use of a
person’s likeness be entirely unnecessary or wholly unrelated to the
underlying work.235  The court in Brown found that the “[u]se of a
legendary NFL player’s likeness in a game about NFL football is
clearly relevant,” even considering the fact that Jim Brown, the plain-
tiff in that case, had long since retired from the sport.236  By the Davis
plaintiff class’s own allegations, the Madden series purports to create a
definitive NFL experience for the game’s players.237  It cannot be seri-
ously argued that NFL history is wholly unrelated to crafting a thor-
ough and enjoyable NFL video game experience.  Because former
NFL players are part of that history, they must be related to that goal
as well.238
In order to satisfy the second factor of this prong, the Davis plaintiff
class would have to show that the use was explicitly designed to mis-
lead consumers into believing that the players endorsed the Madden
video game.239  The plaintiff class can succeed under this factor only if
it can show that the use of the players’ likenesses by Madden is merely
a “disguised commercial advertisement” deliberately implying the
players’ endorsement of the game.240
As applied to the Davis class, the use of the players’ likenesses for
the video game is no such use.  The lack of any personally identifying
information, such as name or correct jersey number, should be more
than sufficient to dissuade the average consumer from believing that
the athletes explicitly approved the use.241  This becomes especially
clear when considered in conjunction with the fact that the virtual rep-
234. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989).
235. See id. at 999–1000.
236. Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387, at *12.
237. Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint, supra note 17, at 4.
238. See Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387, at *12; see also Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F.
Supp. 2d 757, 793 (D.N.J. 2011) (finding the use of a former college player’s image in the NCAA
Football video game “has great relevance to the game itself, which is set on a college football
field and revolves around the playing of virtual football”), rev’d, Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717
F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
239. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.
240. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 793, rev’d, Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir.
2013).
241. See Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387, at *14 (“It would require a leap of logic to
conclude that the anonymous, mis-numbered player’s presence in the games equates to Brown’s
endorsement of the games.”).
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resentations of current NFL players, who have explicitly endorsed the
use of their likenesses in the game through a contract between the
league and EA, are labeled with the correct name and jersey number.
Thus, it cannot be contended that EA’s use of the retired players’ like-
nesses in Madden is an explicit attempt to mislead consumers as to the
endorsement of the athletes.  The hypothetical plaintiff class has failed
to establish a cause of action under the second prong of the Cross-
roads Standard.
A judgment under the Crossroads Standard would present an out-
come far more desirable and appropriate than those reached under
the transformative use test in Keller.  Under the transformative use
test, the sincere creative and expressive efforts put forth by the Mad-
den development team in pursuit of creating an immersive gaming ex-
perience242 would support a finding that EA had violated the
plaintiffs’ publicity rights.243  This goes far beyond ignoring significant
expressive elements and, in fact, punishes the game’s creators for their
creative and expressive attempts to faithfully and artfully reproduce
the NFL experience.244  This is an especially unacceptable result
where, as in the case of the Madden video games, any use of the plain-
tiffs’ likenesses is intended to create a more effective conduit through
which the gamers may immerse themselves into the game.245
Such a standard would have avoided the overreaching decisions
reached by the Third and Ninth Circuits in Hart and Keller.  The stan-
dard utilized by those courts effectively ignored all expressive fea-
tures, artistic elements, and other creative context surrounding the use
of the athlete’s persona in sports video games.246  Such an approach
fails to consider that even literal depictions of an athlete can be pro-
tected in a work that contains significant expressive content.247  The
Crossroads Standard necessitates evaluation of the work as a whole,
rather than just the challenged use of the plaintiff’s identity.  As Judge
Thomas Ambro argued in his dissent in Hart, such a narrow focus on
the plaintiff’s likeness alone, rather than on how that likeness was in-
242. See id. at *11.
243. See Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 8, 2010), aff’d sub nom., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litiga-
tion, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
244. See Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131387, at *11–12 (likening the expressiveness of the
Madden NFL games to that of artistic paintings depicting realistic portraits of famous profes-
sional athletes).
245. See id.
246. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268,
1285–86 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141,
172 (3d Cir. 2013) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
247. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003).
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corporated into the work, was a flawed means of approaching the ten-
sion between the right of publicity and the First Amendment.248
Rather, it is important to consider the use in the context of the work
as a whole, as well as the underlying message and purpose of that
work, to determine whether the challenged use actually impinges
upon the athlete’s right of publicity.249  The Crossroads Standard does
just that.
The biggest problem with the transformative use test, as applied in
Comedy III and adopted by the Third and Ninth Circuits, is that it is
an outdated approach that fails to recognize the modern realities of
video games.  The courts applying this test have simply neglected to
realize that all video games—including “simulations” like Madden and
NCAA Football—are inherently fantasy.  Video games allow players
to live out their dreams and aspirations through the vicarious manipu-
lation of a digital avatar.  The creators of the Madden and NCAA
Football games, though modeling the avatars as accurately and realis-
tically to the real-life players as possible, are merely creating a conduit
through which the gamer can realize her greatest aspirations.  This is
an intrinsically transformative and expressive process.
By focusing solely on the likeness, the Third and Ninth Circuits op-
erate on the assumption that it is the likenesses themselves that drive
gamers to these games.  This misses the point.  Gamers do not simply
want to see Johnny Unitas throw a pass to Jerry Rice while avoiding a
sack from a blitzing Lawrence Taylor; gamers want to live that experi-
ence.  The inflexible and outdated transformativeness approach sim-
ply fails to take into account how the avatar, though realistically and
248. Hart, 717 F.3d at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting); see also In re Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority confines
its inquiry to how a single athlete’s likeness is represented in the video game, rather than exam-
ining the transformative and creative elements in the video game as a whole.  In my view, this
approach contradicts the holistic analysis required by the transformative use test.”).
249. Even accepting the propriety of such an argument, this author is of the opinion that the
majority in Hart misapplied its own approach.  The majority cites, with approval, the holding of
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc. that a work “consist[ing] of a collage of images in addition to
[the athlete’s] image which are combined to describe, in artistic form, a historic event in sports
history and to convey a message about the significance of [the athlete’s] achievement in that
event” was transformative. Hart, 717 F.3d at 161 (quoting ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332
F.3d 915, 938–39 (6th Cir. 2003)).  However, the majority then concludes that the use is not
sufficiently transformative in part because, “[g]ames such as NCAA Football permit users to
recreate the setting of a bitter defeat and, in effect, achieve some cathartic readjustment of history
. . . .” Id. at 168 (emphasis added).  Clearly, the use of players’ identities (and especially players
such as Brown and Davis, who are deemed “historic”) constitutes the game creators’ creative
attempts to capture important “historic event[s] in sports history and to convey a message about
the significance” of games held in high regard by fans of the sport. Id. at 161.  The majority
made no attempt to distinguish the capturing of historic sports events in video games from those
in the collage at issue in ETW.
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faithfully modeled after a real-life person, is transformed into a vehi-
cle for the dreams and desires of the average gamer.
Under the Crossroads Standard, the plaintiffs’ class action would be
dismissed because it would be unable to overcome First Amendment
concerns attaching to the creation of an expressive work under the
two-pronged test.  Additionally, because the Crossroads Standard
would be a universal one, this result would follow no matter what ju-
risdiction heard the case, something that cannot be said with any sem-
blance of surety under the current right of publicity scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
In Henry IV: Part I, William Shakespeare introduced the idea of
“giv[ing] the devil his due.”250  While Shakespeare could hardly have
predicted the meteoric rise of the professional athlete’s fame and the
consequences of life in the limelight that would follow, his words are
applicable to the scenario we find ourselves in today.  And unfortu-
nately, rather than “stand[ing] to his word” as would Sir John in
Shakespeare’s work, today’s athlete has found increasingly ingenious
legal means of preventing the devil from “hav[ing] his bargain.”251
Athletes owe the fame and fortune that they enjoy to the fans who
support and adore them.252  And, as with any deal, that fame and no-
toriety must be backed by adequate consideration.  Professional ath-
letes choose to deal with the public devil, and as Robert Johnson
would attest to, the devil always collects on a truant debt.253
Unless some action is taken to standardize the law in the area, the
right of publicity will continue to be a quagmire of varying tests and
inconsistent applications.  By allowing the Davis litigation to move
past the summary judgment stage, the Northern District of California
has illustrated this point and symbolized the direction that the right of
publicity is heading.  The Crossroads Standard suggested by this Com-
ment serves the ultimate purposes of harmonizing widely variant state
approaches to the right of publicity, while simultaneously curtailing
rapidly bloating publicity rights and ensuring that Shakespeare’s pro-
phetic proclamations ring true centuries later.  Professional athletes
250. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH act 1, sc. 2.
251. Id.
252. See Crawley, supra note 11 (analyzing the substantial amount of influence fans can exert
over professional sports teams merely by virtue of attendance and ticket sales).
253. See PATTERSON, supra note 4, at 10.
2013] SELLING YOUR SOUL AT THE CROSSROADS 121
fall to their knees before the sports-loving public at the crossroads,
and ultimately the devil must get his due.
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